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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we focus on public procurement for innovation. We provide a broad 
characterisation of the firms involved in “innovative public procurement” as opposed to 
firms participating in “regular” (i.e. non innovative) public procurement, including those 
firms that perform innovation in an autonomous way (i.e. not related to public 
procurement). Moreover, we identify the main determinants of the firms’ propensity to 
innovate, when innovative activities are related to a public procurement contract. We 
carry out this study by using micro-data from two Community Innovation Surveys for 
Italian and Norwegian firms, which have released information on firms having public 
procurement contracts. Our main findings highlight important differences between firms 
engaged in regular or innovative public procurement, in particular regarding the role of 
firm size and sectors, the presence of in-house R&D activities and the educational level of 
employees. 
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1. Introduction 
Public procurement is the purchase of goods and services by governments and state-owned 
companies. During the last fifteen years, both at the European and national levels, public 
procurement has been intensely revitalised as a demand-side policy instrument to foster innovation.  
Such a renewed attention can be found in many documents and initiatives of the European 
Commission. Among other reports, we can recall the guide on public procurement as a driver of 
innovation in Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) and in public services (European 
Commission, 2014). Furthermore, relevant EC initiatives have been directed to closely monitoring 
national policy frameworks and spending on innovation procurement across Europe, as well as to 
quantifying its impact compared to other procurement approaches (cf. EC, 2016a). Finally, 
increasing evidence that public procurement for innovation is still underexploited, especially in 
supporting innovative start-ups and SMEs, has led the Commission to express the need for a new 
guidance document (EC, 2016b). Then, on May 2018 the Commission has published a “Guidance 
on innovation procurement” to encourage public buyers of goods and services to use public 
procurement as a means to stimulate innovations (EC, 2018). 
The growing interest in the use of public procurement as innovation policy tool is mainly due the 
fact that supply-side innovation policies (such as R&D public subsidies and tax incentives) are 
deemed to be insufficient to meet the current challenges in promoting competitiveness  (Edler and 
Georghiou, 2007), also because of increasing budgetary constraints.  
As stressed by Appelt and Galindo-Rueda (2016, p. 6), in spite of the increasing policy interest, 
“there is very limited statistical evidence on the link between public procurement and innovation”. 
In the early 2000s, the empirical literature on public procurement for innovation was rather 
fragmented and mostly limited to case studies (e.g. Edquist et al., 2000; Edler et al., 2005). Only 
recently, some studies based on sound statistical and/or econometric evidence have been published 
(Aschhoff and Sofka, 2009; Slavtchev and Wiederhold, 2011; Guerzoni and Raiteri, 2014; Ghisetti, 
2017; Florio et al., 2018).  
In this paper, we carry out a micro-econometric analysis with the aim of contributing to this 
relatively under-researched topic: first, by providing a broad characterisation of the firms involved 
in “innovative public procurement” (IPP, henceforth), as opposed to firms participating in “usual” 
(i.e. non innovative) public procurement (PP), including those that perform innovation in an 
autonomous way (i.e. not related to PP contracts); then, by identifying the main determinants of the 
firms’ propensity to innovate, when innovative activities are related to a PP contract.  
As already mentioned, there are some studies on IPP based on quantitative analysis, most of them 
aimed at examining the contribution of PP to firms’ innovation success in terms of increased 
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innovation inputs and outputs. By far less attention has been paid to the question of what strategies 
or firms’ characteristics increase the probability that firms will introduce innovations as part of a 
public procurement contract. 
We carry out this study by using micro-data from two Community Innovation Surveys for Italian 
and Norwegian firms, which have released information on firms having public procurement 
contracts. In the appendix we also consider the case of Portugal for which, due to the low number of 
firms with IPP, it is unlikely that an analysis similar to that done for the former countries will give 
rise to equally reliable results. 
As for Italy, the dataset has been provided by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) and 
it is concerned with the year 2012. With regard to Norway, the analysis is based on most recent 
micro-data provided by Eurostat, which refer to 20142. Therefore, another original aspect of this 
study is that, by comparing Italy and Norway, we examine whether the key determinants of firms’ 
innovation induced by PP are the same or not in two very different institutional and economic 
context.  
Starting from Italy, it is well known the “bias” of the industrial system towards SMEs, which 
mainly operate in traditional, low-skilled and non R&D-intensive sectors. In addition, the Italian 
research and innovation system scores low on several specific aspects relevant to foster R&D and 
innovation, such as the share of public and private R&D investments, the endowment and 
employment of highly-skilled human resources and the cooperation between academia and 
business.  
In Norway, the manufacturing sector, traditionally characterised by a predominance of small firms 
and industries involved in the basic processing of raw materials, has experienced, since the late 
1970s, significant structural changes brought, on the one hand, by the development of the oil, gas 
and service industries, on the other, by the substantial decline of many labour-intensive industries. 
Moreover, the Norwegian national innovation system is characterised by high R&D expenditures 
and developed public and private research infrastructures.  
Interestingly enough, the main features of the current Italian model of public procurement dates 
back to 2000. With the Dlgs. 50/2016, Italy has continued the reform of public procurement in line 
with the 2014 European directives (23/EU, 24/EU and 25/EU). Norway’s original legislation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Eurostat provided us with a CD-ROM containing micro-data from CIS 2014 only for some European countries (Italy 
excluded). Among the North European countries that could be opposed to Italy, only for Norway we found a complete 
and consistent set of information related to PP and IPP. Although the Italian and Norwegian micro-data do not refer to 
the same year, we are not too worried about the meaningfulness of our comparison. Indeed, it is likely that the structural 
and behavioural characteristics of the firms with PP contracts did not change very much from 2012 to 2014: first, 
because the two years are very close; secondly, because PP is usually based on multi-year contracts.  	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implementing public procurement has been in force since 1994. However, the Norwegian 
legislation on public procurement is now, to a large extent, also based on the EU 2014 directives, in 
accordance with Norway’s obligations under the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement. 
These new directives have been implemented during 2016, and have thus entered into force on 1st 
January 2017. 
 
 
2. Innovation induced by public procurement 
 
2.1 Conceptual framework  
 
In its most general definition, IPP occurs when “a public agency places an order for a product or a 
system which does not exist at the time, but which could probably be developed within a reasonable 
period” (see Edquist and Hommen, 2000; Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2012). As such, this is 
usually opposed to the “usual” or “regular” PP, which takes place when a public body buys goods 
and services that already exist. A more precise definition is provided by the European Commission 
which distinguishes between “Pre-commercial Procurement” and “Public Procurement of 
Innovative Solutions”. In the first case, public buyers purchase the R&D services that are likely to 
give rise to entirely new goods or services. In the second one, instead, “the contracting authorities 
act as launch customer for innovative goods and services that are not yet available on a large-scale 
commercial basis” (EC, 2014, p. 12). Hence, the major advantage of IPP lies in a substantial 
reduction of the market risk for the firms delivering innovative solutions. In the present paper, IPP 
mainly corresponds to the second definition. 
From a theoretical point of view, the discussion on IPP is intrinsically linked with the debate on the 
role of demand as a driver of innovation. Scholars embracing the demand-pull approach have 
always emphasized the importance of demand dynamics as a crucial factor influencing both the 
decision of firms to innovate and the direction of the firms’ innovative efforts. The intuition 
regarding the role of demand for innovation has been sparked by the seminal contribution of 
Schmookler (1966), who claims that demand conditions crucially influence the desirability and 
realization of innovations: indeed, the existence of an expected profitability through market 
expansion represents the key stimulus to which innovative firms actually react. However, since the 
1980’s, the focus of the innovation literature has shifted in favour of supply-side factors. Only more 
recently, in particular with the work by Edler and Georghiou (2007), the long debate between the 
supply-push versus demand-pull sources of innovation has settled for a more balanced view, which 
sees demand as a complementary factor driving innovation.  
According to Guerzoni (2010), this recent wave of studies is characterised by the mixture of two 
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elements. On the one hand, the extent of the demand, possibly measured by the size of the market, 
can be considered as a major incentive for firms to invest in R&D, as long as it determines the 
expected innovation profits. On the other, demand can also be considered as a relevant source of 
information from users which, by providing producers with more accurate knowledge about the 
market needs, may substantially contribute to reduce the inherent uncertainty associated with the 
development of new products. 
 
2.2 Key assumptions 
Despite the existing evidence points to the effectiveness of PP in stimulating innovation, such a 
positive effect cannot be taken for granted. Most importantly for the scope of this study, a number 
of barriers can prevent firms from even entering the PP market, especially when innovation 
represents the specific object of the PP contract.  
Important barriers can be related, on the one hand, to the firms’ awareness of innovation 
opportunities and their capabilities to seize them and, on the other, to the inherent risk aversion of 
the public sector (see  Uyarra et al., 2014).  
Hence, first of all, in comparison with the procurement of already existing goods and services for 
the lowest possible price, the IPP requires a high degree of firms’ in-house competence. It follows 
that, compared to firms with usual PP contracts, firms dealing with innovations related to PP, 
especially when innovation is specifically required as part of the contract, are likely to be more 
active on innovation, namely with internal R&D facilities and a high level of human capital. 
Furthermore, risk aversion of public agencies might lead to use selection criteria privileging firms 
with larger size and longer experience or belonging to R&D-intensive industries. Accordingly, it 
can be assumed that large companies and firms in high-tech industries are more likely to participate 
in IPP instead of being involved in “regular” PP or introducing innovations in an autonomous way. 
Finally, the importance of information coming from sources external to the firms cannot be 
neglected. First, external knowledge might substantially contribute to increase the general 
information and awareness of firms about the availability of this particular form of public support 
and its potential advantages. Second, as already mentioned, external networking, especially with 
potential public procurers, might be considered as a relevant source of information from potential 
users, which would contribute to further reduce firms’ uncertainty related to the development of 
new products. Finally, firms with better access to multiple sources of external knowledge should 
also be in a better position to offer innovative solutions. This should diminish the risk aversion of 
contracting authorities and create an environment of trust which, in turn, could increase the firms’ 
ability to enter into the IPP market. Therefore, a further hypothesis that can be introduced is that the 
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more firms are open to frequent interaction with different external actors and sources of knowledge  
(especially with potential public procurers), the higher the likelihood they will come up with 
innovations induced by public procurement contracts. 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
 
3.1 Variables and econometric method 
By using the CIS micro-data at our disposal, in a first step, we provide a broader characterisation of 
the Italian and Norwegian firms carrying out innovation within a PP contract compared to firms 
participating only in usual (i.e. non innovative) PP and to those autonomously performing 
innovation (i.e. not related to PP contracts).  Next, in a second step, we aim at identifying the key 
determinants of the firms’ propensity to innovate when innovative activities are undertaken as part 
of a PP contract. 
 
Table 1. CIS 2012 and 2014 questionnaires: section on public procurement 
10.1 During the three years 2010 to 2012 (or 2012 to 2014) did your enterprise have any 
procurement contracts to provide goods or services for: 
          (a) Domestic public sector organisations Firms with PP  
(innovative or not)            (b) Foreign public sector organisations 
10.2 Did your enterprise undertake any innovation activities as part of a procurement contract to 
provide goods or services to a public sector organisation? 
-  Yes and innovation required as part of the contract Firms with innovations 
related to PP (required 
and/or not required)  -  Yes but innovation not required as part of the contract 
-  No 
      
Non innovative firms or 
firms with innovations not 
related to PP 
Source: adapted from Eurostat. 
 
 As Table 1 illustrates, drawing on the firms’ answers to the CIS questionnaires, we are able to 
construct three different indicators. The first one, Public Procurement, is a binary indicator equal to 
1 if a firm has declared to have any PP contract (i.e. in general, without specifying whether 
involving innovation or not) with domestic and/or foreign public sector organisations, and 0 
otherwise. Then, in order to identify firms carrying out innovation within a PP contract, we have 
built a second binary indicator, Innovation related to PP, equal to 1 if a firm has declared to have 
undertaken innovation as part of a PP contract (i.e. in general, thus with innovation required and/or 
not required), and 0 otherwise. Next, a third binary indicator, Innovation required, is used to 
distinguish and keep separated firms developing innovations that are specifically required by PP 
contracts. 
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Table 2. Basic descriptive statistics on public procurement and innovation (percentages on total  
firms in round brackets; percentages on firm with PP in squared brackets). 
  Italy (CIS 2012) Norway (CIS 2014) 
Total number of firms 18697 4974 
Firms with Public Procurement (PP) 5137 (27.47) 1691 (34.00) 
Firms with PP and innovations  (both related 
and not related to PP) 
3039 [59.16] 1178 [69.66] 
Firms with innovations not related to PP 2205 [42.92] 752 [44.47] 
Firms with innovations related to PP (both 
required and not required by PP) 
834 [16.24] 426 [25.19] 
Firms with innovations specifically required 
by PP contracts 
499 [9.71] 205 [12.12] 
Source: own computations on CIS 2012 Italian and CIS 2014 Norwegian data. 
 
Table 2 shows that Norwegian firms participate in PP more frequently (34%) than firms in Italy 
(27.5%). Moreover, firms with PP in Norway are more innovative than their Italian counterparts. 
This difference is mainly due to the shares of firms with innovations related to PP (25% in Norway, 
16% in Italy). However, in Italy there are relatively more firms with innovations specifically 
required by PP contracts while the opposite occurs in Norway.   
According to a recent OECD study (Appelt and Galindo-Rueda, 2016) mostly based on CIS data (at 
least for European countries), between 9% and 34% of firms operating in countries for which data 
are available have delivered goods or services to public authorities during the three-year period of 
reference 2010-2012. Not surprisingly, public procurement turns out to be more common in large 
firms than in SMEs. 
 
Table 3. Firms involved in public procurement: percentage by size class 
      Italy (CIS 2012) Norway (CIS 2014) 
      
SMEs  Large firms Total  SMEs 
Large 
firms  Total        
      
Percentage of firms with 
PP (on total firms) 27.06  31.29  27.47  32.86  46.21  34.00  
Percentage of firms with 
innovations related to PP 
(on firms with PP) 
14.01  34.15  16.24  24.53  30.26  25.19  
Source: own computations on CIS 2012 Italian and CIS 2014 Norwegian micro-data. 
Note: SMEs are firms with less than 250 employees; Large firms are with more than 249 employees. 
 
CIS micro-data for Italy and Norway confirms the aforementioned finding (cf. Table 3). Indeed, as 
for firms participating in PP, the share is bigger for large firms than for SMEs in both surveys 
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(accounting for 31% and 46%, respectively). Turning to firms with innovation related to PP, it is 
interesting to note that, though only for Italy, the share for large firms become even higher (34%). 
 
Table 4. Firms involved in public procurement: number and percentage by industry 
  
High-
tech 
industry 
Low-tech 
industry KIBS Transports 
Public 
utilities Construction 
Trade 
and other 
services 
Total 
Italy (CIS 2012) 
Firms with PP 236 436 740 234 444 1959 1088 5137 
Firms with innovations 
related to PP 73 76 230 39 87 189 140 834 
Percentage of firms with PP 
(on total firms) 20.42  14.16  30.71  17.53  47.54  45.06  20.02  27.47  
Percentage of firms with 
innovations related to PP (on 
firms with PP ) 
30.93  17.43  31.08  16.67  19.59  9.65  12.87  16.24  
Norway (CIS 2014) 
Firms with PP 122 255 549 93 103 248 321 1691 
Firms with innovations 
related to PP 41 60 195 11 21 39 59 426 
Percentage of firms with PP 
(on total firms) 26.35  20.21  42.46  29.15  44.98  51.35  34.70  34.00  
Percentage of firms with 
innovations related to PP (on 
firms with PP ) 
33.61  23.53  35.52  11.83  20.39  15.73  18.38  25.19  
Source: own computations on CIS 2012 Italian and CIS 2014 Norwegian micro-data. 
 
Table 4 reports the firms’ distribution across seven aggregate sectors. Sectorial aggregations are 
based on the two-digit NACE (Statistical Classification of Economic Activities). With respect to 
high- and low-tech industry, we have followed the OECD ISIC Rev. 3 technology intensity 
definition of manufacturing industries (OECD, 2011). In particular, we have grouped together firms 
in high and medium-high technology sectors into the unique category of High-tech industry; 
likewise, firms in low- and medium-low technology sectors have been grouped together in Low-
tech industry. In order to identify firms in knowledge intensive business services (KIBS) and keep 
them separated from those in other, traditional or less knowledge intensive services, we have 
referred to the Eurostat classification 3 . The other sectors are Public utilities, Transports, 
Construction, Trade and other services (which plays the role of reference category)4. 
According to Table 4, firms involved in PP are mostly in construction, public utilities and 
knowledge intensive business services KIBS, either in Italy or in Norway. As for firms with 
innovations related to PP, in Italy high-tech industries and KIBS are largely predominant, with a 
share equal to 31% of firms with PP contracts, whilst in all the other sectors the percentage of firms 
is much lower (with a partial exception of public utilities). In Norway, firms with innovations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/Annexes/htec_esms_an3.pdf. 
4 To get more meaningful information from our estimates, we prefer to employ few aggregate sectors rather than a very 
high number of two-digit industries.  
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related to PP are also very concentrated in high-tech industries and knowledge intensive business 
services (34% and 36%, respectively); however, also in low-tech industry and public utilities we 
can observe a significant presence, since they account for more than 20% of firms with PP 
contracts. 
Moving to the econometric method, our analysis is based upon a Heckman probit model with 
sample selection. Such a model is composed of two probit equations: an outcome equation for the 
probability of introducing innovations related to PP (IPP), and a selection equation for the 
probability of being involved in PP. Formally: 
 𝐼𝑃𝑃! = 1 𝑿!! + 𝜖! > 0     𝑖𝑓  𝑃𝑃! = 1,   𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 [1]   𝑃𝑃! = 1 𝒁!!𝛼 + 𝑢! > 0        [2] 
where the suffix i identifies firms. 
Thus, the firm characteristics that increase the PP participation are used to correct the estimation of 
the probability of being involved in IPP. Despite the parameters of the model are identified even 
when the same set of regressors enters the selection and outcome equations (i.e. Xi and Zi include 
the same variables), to improve identification it is a standard practice to use different covariates in 
the second equation (selection), which must be unrelated to the innovation probability (outcome). 
Then, the model can be estimated with Maximum Likelihood (ML) either simultaneously (one-step) 
or with a two-step procedure. 
Among the control variables that are used in both the selection and innovation equations we 
consider the Firm size, measured by the log of turnover recorded in 2012 (for Italian firms) and 
2014 (for Norwegian firms), and seven dummy variables accounting for the firms’ sectors (see 
above). 
Then, there is a set of variables affecting only the probability to innovate. Among these, we have 
included two variables routinely used in empirical studies on innovation: Human capital, measured 
by a categorical indicator taking values from 0 to 6 according to the percentage of employees with 
an university degree5; and R&D performing firms, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm 
has carried out R&D intra-muros. Further regressors account for the use of external knowledge 
sources: Cooperation with universities and Cooperation with government, are binary indicators of 
whether a firm has cooperated with universities and with government or public research institutes; 
Overall importance of cooperation, which should detect the overall importance of external 
cooperation for innovation (i.e. regardless the type of partner), is equal to 1 if a firm has declared to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The classes are the following: 0 stands for none graduated employee; 1 for less than 5%, 2 for 5 to 9%, 3 for10-24%, 4 
for 25-49%, 5 for 50-74% and 6 for 75% and more. 
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have cooperation linkages with all types of partners among those listed in the CIS6, 0 otherwise; 
Acquisition of external knowledge indicates whether a firm has invested for the acquisition of 
external knowledge, thus outside any formal cooperation agreement. 
Finally, another set of variables affects only the probability of being involved in PP. Firms 
belonging to a group is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if a firm belongs to an enterprise 
group, 0 otherwise. Firms operating in domestic market only is equal to 1 if a firm has declared to 
sell its products only in the domestic market, 0 otherwise. New ways of organising external 
relations is also a binary indicator used to identify firms having introduced organisational 
innovations facilitating their external relations. By capturing the firm attitude and efforts to 
undertake alliances or collaborations with other enterprises, this variable should exert a positive 
impact on PP. In fact, especially for SMEs, to participate in public tenders involving big amounts of 
money and/or different competencies it is necessary to set up a temporary association of companies.  
 
3.2 Results  
 
The following tables report the results of the described econometric analysis for Italy and Norway. 
Table 5 shows the results of the Heckman probit estimation for the probability of being engaged in 
IPP, when innovation is related to PP (i.e. regardless of whether it is required or not), conditional on 
the probability of being included in the sample, namely of being involved in PP. Next, in Table 6, 
we present the results for the probability of being engaged in IPP, when innovation is specifically 
required by PP. In both cases, the outcome and selection equations are estimated simultaneously.   
 
Table 5. Heckman probit model with sample selection: one step simultaneous estimation 
  ITALY (CIS 2012) NORWAY (CIS 2014) 
Variables 
Innovation related to 
PP (outcome equation) PP 
Innovation related to 
PP (outcome equation) PP 
 
(selection 
eq.) 
 
(selection 
eq.) 
Constant  1.2690*** -1.7164*** 1.1559** -1.8469*** 
  (0.1718) (0.1115) (0.4984) (0.1977) 
Firm size (log of turnover) -0.0421*** 0.0492*** -0.0636*** 0.0903*** 
  (0.0089) (0.0070) (0.0197) (0.0121) 
High-tech industries 0.0816 -0.0932* 0.2070* -0.3101*** 
  (0.0675) (0.0483) (0.1140) (0.0781) 
Low-tech industries 0.2215*** -0.2274*** 0.3260*** -0.4638*** 
  (0.0517) (0.0350) (0.1036) (0.0589) 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 These are: other firms in the same business group, suppliers, clients or costumers (both public and private), 
competitors, consultants, universities, government and research institutes. 
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Table 5 (continues) 
Knowledge intensive business services -0.1273** 0.2729*** -0.0501 0.1877*** 
  (0.0496) (0.0337) (0.0893) (0.0550) 
Public utilities -0.4724*** 0.7390*** -0.1593 0.2287** 
  (0.0602) (0.0461) (0.1209) (0.0949) 
Transports  0.1777*** -0.0867* -0.0171 -0.1943** 
(0.0627) (0.0453) (0.1463) (0.0854) 
Construction -0.6639*** 0.7757*** -0.2893*** 0.4566*** 
  (0.0410) (0.0285) (0.0983) (0.0722) 
Cooperation with universities 0.0461   0.2914***   
  (0.0689)   (0.0944)   
Cooperation with government  0.3116***   0.0769   
(0.0894)   (0.0965)   
Overall importance of cooperation  0.0501   0.0610   
(0.1710)   (0.1502)   
Acquisition of external knowledge 0.1787***   0.2062***   
(0.0410)   (0.0697)   
Human capital (ordinal var. 0 to 6) 0.0237***   0.0165   
(0.0074)   (0.0193)   
R&D performing firms 0.2652***   0.3256***   
  (0.0399)   (0.1007)   
Firms belonging to a group   0.0449**   -0.0056 
    (0.0195)   (0.0406) 
Firms operating in domestic market 
only   0.0308   -0.0673* 
    (0.0197)   (0.0351) 
New ways of organising external 
relations   0.4290***   0.2818*** 
    (0.0296)   (0.0571) 
Wald test of independent equations 
(rho=0) 133.02*** 10.47*** 
athrho -1.8133*** -1.4522*** 
Observations 18,697 4,974 
Censored obs. (firms without PP 
contracts) 13,560 3,283 
Uncensored obs. (firms with PP 
contracts) 5,137 1,691 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Trade and other services, among industry dummies, used as reference  
category. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10  
 
 
First of all, as the bottom lines of the tables show, the hypothesis of independent equations is 
refused by the Wald test, which confirms that, in both estimations, the outcome and the selection 
equations should not be estimated separately. Moreover, the negative and significant athrho (i.e. the 
negative correlation of the residuals of equations 1 and 2) suggests that there are some un-
observables firm characteristics that increase the probability of PP participation while reducing the 
likelihood of innovation. 
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Regarding the specific determinants of PP, only the variable accounting for the implementation of 
organisational innovations impacting firm external relations seems to play a pervasive role, being 
positive and highly significant in both countries. This finding confirms that, especially SMEs, in 
order to smooth and speed-up procurement procedures, might need to set-up not only an early 
interaction in procurement to get a close and early engagement with the public buyer, but also a 
broad range of external relations, which would be useful to gain access to information and 
knowledge not available in-house. This could further be supported by the positive and significant 
coefficient also emerged for group membership, though in this case only for Italy. 
Moving to the innovation equation, the first thing to stress is that, in both countries, the firm size is 
still significant but negatively associated with the dependent variable. Hence, for firms with 
innovations related to PP, compared to firms with regular PP contracts, size does not matter. 
Contrary to our expectations, belonging to low-tech industries increases the probability to innovate 
via PP in both estimates. Transports is also proved to be a high innovative sector, though only for 
Italy. In both countries, the impact of construction is negative and significant as expected. As for 
Norway, knowledge intensive business services are no more significant, while being in these sectors 
or in public utilities decrease the likelihood of achieving innovation related to PP in Italy.  
Next, compared to firms involved in general PP contracts, it is confirmed that, for firms with 
innovations related to PP, to perform R&D activities and have a high level of human capital do play 
a significant role. As for the use of external sources of knowledge, cooperation with government 
and research labs shows an important effect, though only in Italy; by contrast, in Norway, 
universities seems to be most important as partners of cooperative projects for innovation. In both 
countries, firms’ engagement in acquisition of external knowledge (i.e. outside any formal 
cooperation) is also positive and highly significant. 
Turning to Table 6, it can be noticed that, overall, we have found almost consistent results. Hence, 
also when innovation is specifically required as part of the PP contract, the selected firms are 
confirmed to be very different from those with usual (i.e. non innovative) PP.  
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Table 6. Heckman probit model with sample selection: one step simultaneous estimation 
  ITALY (CIS 2012) NORWAY (CIS 2014) 
 
Innovation 
required by PP 
(outcome eq.) 
PP 
(selection eq.) 
 
 
Innovation 
required by PP 
(outcome eq.) 
PP 
(selection eq.) 
 
 
Constant  0.7462*** -1.7542*** 0.3549 -1.8655*** 
  (0.2333) (0.1147) (0.9458) (0.1994) 
Firm size (log of turnover) -0.0344*** 0.0515*** -0.0553* 0.0912*** 
  (0.0109) (0.0072) (0.0283) (0.0122) 
High-tech industries 0.1965** -0.0935* 0.3591*** -0.3122*** 
  (0.0796) (0.0484) (0.1341) (0.0781) 
Low-tech industries 0.3076*** -0.2277*** 0.4085*** -0.4678*** 
  (0.0642) (0.0351) (0.1249) (0.0590) 
Knowledge intensive business 
services -0.0305 0.2749*** -0.0255 0.1896*** 
  (0.0645) (0.0340) (0.1285) (0.0554) 
Public utilities -0.3845*** 0.7378*** -0.1622 0.2235** 
  (0.0765) (0.0463) (0.1690) (0.0951) 
Transports  0.3001*** -0.0851* 0.2236 -0.1989** 
(0.0786) (0.0453) (0.1612) (0.0853) 
Construction -0.6148*** 0.7766*** -0.3142** 0.4510*** 
  (0.0548) (0.0287) (0.1449) (0.0726) 
Cooperation with universities 0.1607**   0.3838***   
  (0.0793)   (0.1407)   
Cooperation with government  0.2162**   0.0743   
(0.0939)   (0.1062)   
Overall importance of cooperation  -0.0399   0.0021   
(0.1528)   (0.1541)   
Acquisition of external 
knowledge 
0.1704***   0.2134**   
(0.0509)   (0.0926)   
Human capital (ordinal var. 0 to 
6) 
0.0228**   0.0448   
(0.0103)   (0.0302)   
R&D performing firms 0.2076***   0.2685**   
  (0.0478)   (0.1243)   
Firms belonging to a group   0.0310   -0.0027 
    (0.0222)   (0.0446) 
Firms operating in domestic 
market only   0.0400*   -0.0597 
    (0.0220)   (0.0393) 
New ways of organising external 
relations   0.4373***   0.2783*** 
    (0.0283)   (0.0641) 
Wald test of independent 
equations (rho=0) 107.82*** 4.84** 
athrho -1.4101*** -1.1404** 
Observations 18,697 4,974 
Censored obs. (firms without PP 
contracts) 13,560 3,283 
Uncensored obs. (firms with PP 
contracts) 5,137 1,691 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Trade and other services, among industry dummies, used as reference  
category. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10  
14	  	  
Compared to firms with innovation related to PP (i.e. regardless of whether it is specifically 
required or not by the contract, cf. Table 5), the most striking differences are that being in high-tech 
industries significantly increase the probability of achieving innovation required by PP in both 
countries; moreover, cooperating with universities in this case play a significant role not only in 
Norway but also in Italy. These findings could suggest that the innovations specifically required by 
PP contracts, at least in part, might be more relevant and complex.  
 
4. Concluding remarks  
The empirical analysis carried out in this paper has shown that there are important differences 
between the firms that are engaged in regular or innovative public procurement. Both in Italy and 
Norway the firm size affects positively the probability of being involved in PP but, then, its impact 
on the likelihood of introducing innovations related to PP is negative. Equally relevant differences 
emerge looking at the firms’ sectors while innovations related to or required by PP contracts also 
depend on the presence of in-house R&D activities and the educational level of employees.     
Of course, these results are preliminary and should be considered in the light of some limitations 
pertaining the generalizability of the findings. First, they are based on cross-sectional datasets that 
do not allow us interpret the results in terms of causality. Secondly, the evidence provided should 
be validated by more empirical work, for instance extending the analysis to other European 
countries.  
Moreover, in order to compare the Italian and Norwegian cases, we have been compelled to work 
with a limited number of potential determinants affecting both the probability to be involved in PP 
and that of innovating due to PP contracts. In fact, for the purposes of our analysis, the CIS 2014 
questionnaire (employed for Norway) provides less detailed information than that of CIS 2012 
(used for Italy). So, it will be interesting to inspect whether for the Italian case the present findings 
will  be confirmed by including in the regression analyses a wider set of explanatory variables.       
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Appendix: the case of Portugal 
 
The following tables show additional results based on CIS 2014 data for Portugal. As Table A1 reports, in 
this case firms participating in PP are much less (19.7%) than those in Italy (27.5%) and Norway (34%) (cf. 
Table 2). Moreover, compared to the former countries, the most striking difference is that in Portugal there 
are few firms (47 only) that have been involved in innovation activities specifically required by PP. 
 
Table A1. Basic descriptive statistics on public procurement and innovation  
(percentages on total firms in round brackets; percentages on firm with PP in squared brackets). 
  Portugal (CIS 2014) 
Total number of firms 5321 
Firms with PP  1046 (19.66) 
Firms with PP and innovations  (both related 
and not related to PP) 712   [68.07] 
Firms with innovations related to PP (both 
required and not required by PP) 207   [19.79] 
Firms with innovations specifically required by 
PP  47  [4.49] 
Source: own computations on CIS 2014 Portuguese micro-data.   
 
Table A2. Firms involved in public procurement: number and percentage by industry 
  
High-tech 
industry 
Low-tech 
industry KIBS Transports 
Public 
utilities Construction 
Trade and 
other 
services 
Total 
Portugal (CIS 2014) 
Firms with PP 75 281 217 82 27 18 346 1046 
Firms with innovations 
related to PP 18 49 58 11 6 6 59 207 
Percentage of firms with PP 
(on total firms) 14.26 12.6 30.26 17.01 23.48 62.07 28.31 19.66 
Percentage of firms with 
innovations related to PP (on 
firms with PP ) 
24.00 17.44 26.73 13.41 22.22 33.33 17.05 19.79 
Source: own computations on CIS 2014 Portuguese micro-data. 
 
Table A2 shows that in Portugal the sectoral distribution of firms with PP contracts is remarkably skewed in 
favour of two sectors: low-tech industries and knowledge intensive business services. Most importantly, the 
very low presence of firms in the construction sector makes Portugal hardly comparable with Italy and 
Norway.  
According to the above features, it is not surprising that the results of the Heckman probit estimation, 
illustrated in Table A3 are not only different but also less satisfactory than those achieved for Italy and 
Norway. In particular, the probability of being engaged in IPP when innovation is related to PP is 
significantly affected by two dummy variables only (R&D presence and cooperation with government). 
Moreover, both in the selection and outcome equation the firm size does not exert any significant impact.  
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Due to the very low number of Portuguese firms with innovations specifically required by PP contracts, we 
did not perform an additional estimation as for Italy and Norway.     
 
Table A3. Heckman probit model with sample selection: one step  
simultaneous estimation 
 PORTUGAL (CIS 2014) 
 Innovation related to 
PP (outcome eq.) 
PP 
(selection eq.) 
 
Constant  0.5477 -0.8223*** 
  (0.4998) (0.2268) 
Firm size (log of turnover) -0.0276 0.0118 
  (0.0251) (0.0147) 
High-tech industries 0.2694 -0.5564*** 
  (0.1723) (0.0797) 
Low-tech industries 0.2154 -0.5710*** 
  (0.1344) (0.0530) 
Knowledge intensive business services 0.1599 0.0173 
  (0.1192) (0.0654) 
Public utilities -0.0654 -0.1698 
  (0.2359) (0.1371) 
Transports  0.0140 -0.4022*** 
(0.1724) (0.0783) 
Construction -0.1220 0.7944*** 
  (0.3161) (0.2405) 
Cooperation with universities 0.1627   
  (0.1517)   
Cooperation with government  0.4582**   
(0.1852)   
Overall importance of cooperation  0.1294   
(0.4469)   
Acquisition of external knowledge 0.0161   
(0.1184)   
Human capital (ordinal var. 0 to 6) -0.0337   
(0.0260)   
R&D performing firms 0.2209**   
  (0.1008)   
Firms belonging to a group   0.0948* 
    (0.0507) 
Firms operating in domestic market 
only   -0.0495 
    (0.0510) 
New ways of organising external 
relations   0.4154*** 
    (0.0514) 
Wald test of independent equations 
(rho=0) 8.81*** 
athrho -0.8791*** 
Observations 5,321 
Censored obs. (firms without PP 
contracts) 4,275 
Uncensored obs. (firms with PP 
contracts) 1,046 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Trade and other services, among industry dummies,  
used as reference category. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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